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USING ACCOUNTING DATA IN CARTEL DAMAGE 




Standard methods for calculating cartel-damages rely on data of prices charged and quantity sold. Such data may 
not easily be available. In this paper, it is shown that a lower bound for cartel-damages can also be computed 
from accounting data. In previous literature it is shown that economic profits can hardly be inferred from 
accounting data. Therefore, it is shown under which econometrically testable assumptions on accounting costs a 
meaningful lower bound for cartel damages can consistently be estimated from accounting data. An estimation of 
cartel-damages is performed for four vitamins producers that participated in the vitamins cartel. The results 
indicate that both the aggregation-level and the publication-frequency  of accounting data pose a challenge to the 
estimation   of   cartel   damages.  A  further   challenge   is   to   appropriately  reflect   the   strength   respectively 
effectiveness of the collusive agreement in the specification of any such estimation.
JEL: C22, L12, L13, L41
I. INTRODUCTION
Cartel firms jointly maximize their profits by simultaneously reducing quantity sold and increasing 
the price of goods sold. Hence, they damage their customers by charging an excess payment,  i.e. 
the cartel-induced price overcharge times the quantity sold.
1 In USA, harmed customers have legal 
standing to recover three times the damages that were caused by the firms infringing antitrust laws 
(15 United States Code §15(a)). In Europe, the foundations of damage claims were laid by the 
European Court of Justice in its Courage-Crehan decision.
2 Currently, the conditions for private 
damage claims are debated intensively as in the European Commission's 2008 White Paper on 
Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules
3  and its accompanying working paper.
4 
* Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, Chair for Industrial Organization, Regulation and Antitrust, Licher Straße 62 D-
35394 Giessen, johannes.paha@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de
1 Robert Hall/Victoria Lazear, 'Reference Guide on Estimation of Economic Losses in Damages Awards',  Federal 
Judicial Center Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 2nd edition (2000), at 322
2 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others, Judgment of the 
Court of 20 September 2001
3 European Commission, 'White Paper on Damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules', COM(2008) 165 final, 
(2008)
4 European Commission, 'Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for 
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Regarding damages as a compensatory instrument
5  requires an unbiased estimate of damages. 
However, the Commission is well aware that the quality of damage-estimates“ depends very much 
on the quality [... and] the complexity of the required input.”
6  Therefore, damages are intended to 
be calculated pragmatically trading-off accuracy with the “cost and time involved in bringing and 
assessing the required economic evidence.”
7
The calculation of cartel-damages and cartels' profitability effects generally is based on data 
of goods' quantities sold and prices charged. Unfortunately, data on prices and quantities is not 
easily available to both, researchers and damage claimants, since firms are not required to publish it. 
In contrast, some cartels may even use lobbying  to prevent such data from being published or they 
may actively withdraw it from the public. This was supposedly done by members of the vitamins 
cartel as is reported by Connor
8. The unavailability of price- and quantity-data poses a difficulty for
1. researchers doing research about cartel damages,
2. competition authorities screening industries in order to detect collusion, and
3. private damage claimants who need to calculate their claims.
For these groups it would be beneficial if cartel-damages could be computed from data that is easily 
available and allows for a comparison among firms and across time. These requirements are largely 
satisfied   by   accounting   data   which   follows   standardized   accounting   rules.   This   facilitates 
comparability among firms in the same jurisdiction. For capital market-oriented firms that apply 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) comparability is made possible even on an 
international scale. Moreover, financial data of large, capital market-oriented firms may easily be 
obtained from financial databases such as Thomson Reuters Datastream. There are also databases 
that provide data of smaller firms such as the Hoppenstedt database for German enterprises.
One contribution of this paper lies in examining  if  accounting data may be used for 
econometrically estimating cartel damages. It is shown that under some testable assumptions on 
accounting costs a cartel members' change in revenues minus costs of goods sold can be used as a 
lower bound for cartel damages. By concentrating on changes in measures of accounting profit this 
paper does not affect the literature on inferring absolute values of economic profits from accounting 
5 Id, at 55
6 Id, at 60
7 Id, at 55
8 John Connor, Global Price Fixing – Our Customers are the Enemy (Norwell, Kluver Academic Publishers 2001), at 
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data. This literature
9 centers around Fisher and McGowan's
10 article On the Misuse of Accounting 
Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits. In this literature it is i.a. argued that capital in accounting 
does not match the economic definition of capital since e.g. research is considered an expense rather 
than being capitalized. This distorts depreciation and, thus, profit measures in  subsequent years. 
This effect of a distorted time shape  of depreciation is amplified when depreciation follows 
simplifying (e.g. linear) depreciation schedules rather than economic depreciation.
11 Moreover, the 
economic cost of equity is considered a part of profit in accounting and a cost component in 
economics. In sections II.C. and II.D. it is argued that these are valid points whose main effect is to 
drive apart the absolute values of economic profits and accounting profits. It is shown under which 
conditions these effects are unlikely to bias accounting-based estimates of cartel damages. 
Moreover, econometric procedures are proposed for testing whether these conditions are satisfied.
A further contribution of this paper lies in outlining, how a lower bound for cartel damages 
can be estimated consistently from accounting data of revenues and costs of goods sold. This is 
done in section II.A.. In section III. the propositions made in the previous sections are evaluated 
econometrically for four firms, BASF, Takeda, Daiichi, and Roche, that participated in the famous 
and well-researched vitamins cartel. Section IV. concludes.
II. USING ACCOUNTING DATA TO ASSESS CARTEL-EFFECTS – THEORY
A. Definition and Estimation of Cartel Damages
In this section I present a framework for analyzing cartel-damages. In doing so, economic analysis 
is aligned to accounting by employing accounting terminology for e.g. costs and profits. Since the 
empirical part of this paper is done with data obtained from the ThomsonReuters Datastream 
database, the terminology corresponds to the definitions made there. Consider a multiproduct-firm 
9 See e.g. 
William Long/David Ravenscraft, 'The Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return: Comment.” The American Economic 
Review', 74 (3) The American Economic Review (1984), 494-500 and 
Franklin Fisher, 'The Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return: Reply', 74 (3)  The American Economic Review 
(1984), 509-517 and 
Kenneth Peasnell, 'Using Accounting Data to Measure the Economic Performance of Firms', 15  Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy (1996), 291-303 and 
Andrew Stark, 'Estimating economic performance from accounting data – a review and synthesis', 36 The British 
Accounting Review (2004), 312-343
10 Franklin Fisher/John McGowan, 'On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits', 73 (1) 
The American Economic Review (1983), 82-97
11 Harold Hotelling, 'A General Mathematical Theory of Depreciation', 20 (151)  Journal of the American Statistical 
Association (1925), 340-353Page 4 of 27 Using Accounting Data in Cartel Damage Calculations
that produces quantity qi of various types of goods
12 i at constant marginal costs ci and fixed costs
13 
cf. Thus, costs of goods sold (Datastream item WC01051) are given by
C=c f ∑
i
ci⋅qi  . (1)
These goods are sold at price pi, so that revenue (Datastream data type WC01001) is given by 
R=∑
i
pi⋅qi  . (2)
Additionally, one measure of profit, that is relevant in accounting, is operating income per period 
pop (WC01250) which is defined as revenues minus costs of goods sold, depreciation d (WC01151), 







−c f−d−s  . (3)
Now assume, the firm gets the opportunity to participate in a cartel in product j which raises j's 
price from its competitive level pCj to its higher cartel level pKj. This is achieved by restricting 
quantity (qKj < qCj). For the time being, fixed costs, depreciation, and costs for administration and 
selling are assumed to remain unaffected by the cartel.
14 Then, the cartel-related change in operating 












⋅c j , (4)
where DKj is a dummy-variable that takes value 1 if the firm participates in a cartel in good j and 0 
otherwise. It is straightforward to check that under the above assumptions Dpop/DDKj = Dp/DDKj 







ci⋅qi  . (5)
In the following, these results are used to show (a) that Dp/DDKj is a reasonable lower bound for 
cartel damages and (b) that this lower bound can be estimated consistently from accounting data.









⋅pCj−c j  . (6)
12 Please note that the analysis provided in this paper requires goods in segment i to be homogenous, such as cement or 
vitamins. The analysis of cartel damages may be more complex when goods in the same segment i are differentiated. 
Then, a uniform price pi does not exist. This is the case for e.g. insurances.
13 It is left to further research to examine how marginal costs, that vary with output, and fixed costs, that vary over 
time, affect damage calculations.
14 These assumptions are relaxed in sectionsII.C. andII.D..Page 5 of 27 Using Accounting Data in Cartel Damage Calculations
The first summand, the price-effect, makes clear that in comparison to the competitive situation the 
cartel-firm makes an additional profit on each unit sold of good  j, i.e.  qKj, worth the price-
overcharge Dpj/DDKj = (pKj – pCj). The quantity-effect indicates, that the firm sells a lower quantity 
because of increased prices and looses the profit that was generated by this lost output. Given that 
excessive pricing is the firm's only infringement of competition laws
15, total damages TDj can be 
defined as “the amount of the overcharge”
16
TD j= pKj− pCj⋅qKj  . (7)
A further standard assumption that is made here with reference to Fisher and Romaine
17 is that 
antitrust infringements are assumed to solely have a contemporaneous effect. I.e. an infringement of 
antitrust laws committed at time period t is assumed to only harm customers at period t and no later 
period. This assumption seems reasonable in most cases. Otherwise calculating damages would 
require to compute the present value of cartel-induced changes in damage claimants' cash flows. 
This would require making a variety of assumptions about future cash flows that may possibly 
cause a larger degree of inexactness than neglecting these effects.
One may wonder, if  TDj  is really the damage caused by the cartel and, thus, the right 
measure to be used here. Fisher
18 notes that TDj “is what is given in the standard damage award.” 
However, real damages exceed TDj by a deadweight-loss since some customers, who would have 
bought the good at the competitive price pCj, decide not to buy the good at price pKj. This group of 
customers generally has no legal standing to claim damages. Since the main focus of this paper is to 
assist damage claimants in calculating their claims, deadweight loss can reasonably be neglected, 
here. However, TDj may not be the right measure for claims in all circumstances. If the damage 
claimant is a firm itself that uses the cartelized good as an input, TDj may exceed the damage 
claimant's lost profit as the claimant may possibly “pass along part of the effect of the price increase 
to its own customers.”
19 In some jurisdictions the defending cartel-firm may use such a pass-on 
defense-strategy in order to argue that actual damages are lower than TDj. Then, the damage award 
should be lowered accordingly. This is just an additional step in computing damages that builds on 
computing TDj as in (8). Hence, the findings of the present paper, that is only concerned with 
quantifying TDj, are no less relevant when a pass-on defense is allowed. Consequently, regarding 
the objectives of this paper total damages can reasonably be defined according to equation (7).
15 Other types of competition law violations are “price-fixing or market-dividing cartel agreements, [...] or 
exclusionary practices, such as tying and bundling or predatory pricing by a dominant firm” (see below n 22, at 3).
16 Above n 1, at 322
17 Franklin Fisher/R. Craig Romaine, 'Janis Joplin's Yearbook and the Theory of Damages', 5 (1/2)  Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Finance (Winter/Spring 1990), at 151
18 Franklin Fisher, 'Economic Analysis and Antitrust Damages', 29 (3) World Competition (2006), at 390
19 Above n 1, at 322Page 6 of 27 Using Accounting Data in Cartel Damage Calculations






⋅pCj−c j  . (8)
From the above discussion we know that  Dqj/DDKj < 0, while (pCj – cj) ≥ 0 as the firm is assumed to 
make at least zero economic profit in the non-cartel situation. Total damages exceed the firm's 
change in revenues minus costs of goods sold (Dp/DDKj), while under the above assumptions (i.e. 
the cartel does not affect other cost components.) this change must be positive in order to make the 
cartel profitable, i.e. Dp/DDKj > 0. Consequently, Dp/DDKj is a lower bound for cartel damages, that 
can be calculated from freely available accounting data
20. A proxy for the cartel-related change in 
profits can be inferred as regression-coefficient b from a time-series regression of p on DKj and 
further explanatory variables X. e is an error term. Vectors and matrizes are denoted by bold letters.
=⋅DKj X  (9)
Since DKj is a discrete variable b does not exactly match Dp/DDKj as defined in equation (6) since it 







⋅ p j−c j≈ 
DKj
 . (10)
Equation (11) is an empirically estimable counterpart of equation (8)
TD j≥  . (11)
One finds that cartel damages cannot exactly be inferred from accounting data. However, using b as 
a lower bound for cartel-damages does have advantages over simply using the change in revenues 
and can have advantages over using price- and quantity-data. These points will be evaluated in turn.
Sometimes it is argued that “any estimates of the changes in the total value of sales of the 
cartelized product in a given market will also provide a lower bound on the harm done by the 
cartel's formation to customers in that market.”
21 To see this, write the change in revenues caused by 









⋅pCj  . (12)
20 A discussion and evaluation of the accounting data needed is given in sectionII.B..
21 Julian Clarke/Simon Evenett, 'The deterrent effects of national anticartel laws: evidence from the international 
vitamins cartel', The Antitrust Bulletin (Fall 2003), in footnote 22Page 7 of 27 Using Accounting Data in Cartel Damage Calculations







⋅pCj  . (13)
Obviously, the cartel-related change in revenues is a lower bound for cartel damages. However, b is 
a   better   lower   bound.   This   is   for   two   reasons.   First,   equation  (4)  immediately   gives
/DKjR j/DKj since q j/DKj⋅c j0 .   Second,   the   cartel-related   change   in 
revenues can even be negative, thus, providing an unlovely lower bound for damage claims. A short 
discussion of cartels' revenue effects is motivated by Figure 1, which displays industry demand for 
good j, (symmetric) firms' marginal costs c, revenue R, marginal revenue MR, and a monopolist's 
profit p. If more than one firm is active in the industry, industry profits will be lower than p. It is 
assumed that firms do not incur fixed costs. Suppose the cartel is formed by all firms in j's industry. 
Hence, prices and quantities are set according to a monopolist's rationale for profit-maximization, 
i.e. MR=c . 
For Cournot-competition with n firms and a linear demand curve, with consumers' reservation price 
denoted as  A, it can be shown that industry revenue (and consequently each cartel-member's 




3n1   (14)
is satisfied. Thus, one can make the following statements:
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1. The higher the intensity of competition (as represented by a higher number of firms) in the 
non-cartel situation (i.e. the closer prices are to marginal costs) the more probable is a 
positive revenue-effect.
2. Higher marginal costs (relative to the reservation price) induce lower cartel revenues and 
higher competitive revenues. This makes a cartel-related increase in revenues less likely. 
Hence, a positive revenue-effect is especially likely in industries where marginal costs are 
small compared to the reservation price.
3. The size of the market (as represented by the slope of the demand curve) does not enter 
condition (14) and, hence, only affects the absolute change in revenue but not its sign.
To sum up the above discussion, the cartel related change in revenues minus costs of goods sold is a 
better lower bound for cartel damages than the change in revenues alone, since the first is always 
positive and exceeds the latter.
VanDijk and Verboven
22 present further methods for computing total damages. The common 
concept of these methods is to determine the increase in prices that is caused by the cartel (i.e. the 
price overcharge). This can e.g. be done by comparing cartel-prices to prices in the same market in 
cartel-free periods (before-and-after approach) or to cartel-free prices in other geographical or 
product markets (benchmark approach). Then, total damages are calculated by either multiplying 
the absolute price overcharge with quantity sold in the cartel, or by multiplying the percentage price 
overcharge with revenue obtained by the cartel
TD j=p Kj− pCj⋅qKj=
pKj−pCj
pKj
⋅pKj⋅qKj  . (15)
In the latter case, it is important that the percentage price-overcharge is computed relative to the 
cartel-price. Otherwise, adjustments should be made accordingly. If high-quality data of prices and 
quantities is available, these methods allow for an exact calculation of total damages. In this case, 
one should rely rather on these calculations as on ones that are based on accounting data. However, 
unlike accounting data, price- and quantity-data is not routinely provided by firms.
22 Theon van Dijk/Frank Verboven, 'Quantification of damages', forthcoming chapter for Issues in Competition Law 
and Policy, ABA Publications in Antitrust, Ed. W. Dale Collins (2005), available at 
http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/ndbad83/Frank/Papers/Van%20Dijk%20&%20Verboven,%202006.pdfPage 9 of 27 Using Accounting Data in Cartel Damage Calculations
B. Revenue and Costs of Goods Sold
It has been known for long, that “[e]conomists need measures of business performance [...] as 
guides to antitrust policy.”
23 However, economists usually are sceptical about the use of accounting 
data for economic purposes, since often accounting data does not match economic definitions of 
e.g. costs and depreciation. This scepticism has been proven right by e.g. Hotelling
24, Fisher and 
McGowan
25, and Stark
26. However, as Peasnell
27 points out “[a]ccounting reports constitute the only 
systematically compiled, publicly available, alternative source of information about the financial 
affairs of business corporations, and are largely standardized and audited, too.” This is in line with 
the above reasoning of using accounting data for computing cartel damages. Therefore, in this 
section it will be evaluated, if revenues and costs of goods sold are defined such that an calculation 
of b gives economically sensible results.
Revenue (Datastream data type WC01001) according to IAS 18 is defined as “the gross 
inflow of economic benefits during the period arising in the course of the ordinary activities of an 
enterprise [that are defined as] the sale of goods, [...] the rendering of services, [...] and the use by 
others of enterprise assets yielding interest, royalties and dividends.” Hence, accounting revenue is 
defined consistently with economic revenue. Please note, that in case of multi-period construction 
contracts revenues are recognized according to IAS 11. Collusion in such construction contracts is 
more likely to occur in the form of bid-rigging. Since in this case one infringement of antitrust laws 
affects revenues in multiple periods, damages from bid-rigging do not fit well in the framework 
used and proposed here. 
Costs of goods sold (Datastream item WC01051) include among others employee benefits, 
costs of purchase, materials expenses, and other costs that are incurred in bringing goods sold to the 
location and condition necessary for sale. According to IAS 2.9 materials expenses are determined 
as the lower of cost and net realizable value when selling the materials or supplies. The term cost 
comprises “all costs of purchase, costs of conversion and other costs in bringing the [materials and 
supplies] to their present location and condition.” (IAS 2.10) Hence, the accounting cost of raw 
materials is consistent with economic theory.
Accounting of employee benefits follows the rules of IAS 19 which  “identifies four 
23 Kenneth Peasnell, 'Using Accounting Data to Measure the Economic Performance of Firms', 15  Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy (1996), at 291
24 Above n 11
25 Above n 10
26 Andrew Stark, 'Estimating economic performance from accounting data – a review and synthesis', 36  The British 
Accounting Review (2004), 312-343
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categories of employee benefits:
(a) short-term employee benefits, such as wages, salaries and social security contributions […] 
payable within 12 months of the end of the period [...];
(b) post-employment benefits such as pensions [...]
(c) other long-term employee benefits [...] payable 12 months or more after the end of the 
period [...]; and
(d) termination benefits.”
Short-term employee benefits (a) clearly are consistent with the economic definition of wages since 
they are recognized as an expense “when an employee has rendered service in exchange for those 
benefits.” (IAS 19.I.3) The treatment of post-employment benefits (b) is equally simple. Post-
employment benefits can be seen as a reward for employees' current supply of labor that only 
results in a future payment to the employee. Thus, they must be recognized as an expense in the 
current period. Matters are not that clear for other long-term employment benefits (c) and 
termination benefits (d) since these lack a clear relationship to the current period's production. 
However, if other long-term employment benefits and termination do not systematically vary with 
the formation of a cartel they do not affect estimates of cartel-related profit effects and damages.
One finds that revenue and costs of goods sold are defined quite consistently with their 
economic counterparts. Consequently, a regression as specified by equation (9) appears to be a valid 
way for computing a lower bound for cartel damages. One might object that revenues and costs of 
goods sold might be biased by techniques of earnings management. From a theoretic standpoint it is 
not clear how such measures will affect damage estimates. To illustrate this point consider that a 
firm's financial statements are addressed to a variety of groups that have different interests in the 
firm. Shareholders may be assumed to have a desire for high profits. However, with regard to tax 
payments and cartel prosecutions the firm will be interested in showing low profits. Which of these 
effects is stronger, cannot be assessed theoretically but must be evaluated in each case separately. In 
this context, one should also take into account different accounting standards' tolerance for earnings 
measurement, which is e.g. higher in German GAAP than in IFRS or US-GAAP.
C. The Effect of Depreciation on Cartel Damages
In sectionA.  the assumption was made, that the cartel affects nothing but prices charged and 
quantity sold by the cartel members. In this situation, the cartel-induced change in (accounting) 
operating income was found to be identical to the change in revenues minus costs of goods sold, 
whose empirical counterpart may be used as a lower bound for cartel-damages. This finding does 
not hold  any  longer  if  the  cartel  also systematically affects  depreciation. This is  because Page 11 of 27 Using Accounting Data in Cartel Damage Calculations
depreciation has a fixed cost component (E.g. production facilities loose some value by ageing.) and 
a variable cost component. I.e. the cartel-induced reduction of quantity sold will also cause a lower 
quantity produced which affects production facilities' depletion. As a consequence, some part of 
depreciation must be considered an element of marginal costs that determine cartel-firms' pricing 
behavior and, thus, cartel damages. Conceptually, this challenge can be overcome by proxying 
damages with the cartel-induced change in gross income (WC01100) rather than the change in 
revenues minus costs of goods sold. Gross income is defined as revenue minus costs of goods sold 







−c f−d  . (16)









⋅ pCj−c j− d
DKj
  (17)
under the assumption that fixed costs are not affected by the cartel.
In practice, computing this lower bound for cartel damages is not as easy as it may seem 
from a conceptual viewpoint. This results from depreciation, depletion and amortization d being one 
of the items that prevents interested parties from drawing economic inferences from accounting 
data. This is because economic depreciation and accounting depreciation rarely correspond to each 
other and can hardly be made matching at reasonable cost and accuracy. Economic depreciation 
should be computed following the ideas of Hotelling
28 while accounting depreciation often follows 
simplifying (e.g. linear depreciation) schedules. Putting Hotelling's ideas into modern words the 
value of an asset should be determined as the present value of net cash flows (i.e. revenue minus 
production   costs)   generated   by  the   asset   plus   its   discounted   scrap   value.  Thus,   economic 
depreciation (respectively appreciation) is the change in the asset's value between two periods. In 
accounting practice tangible assets according to IAS 16.29 shall either be valued at their cost less 
any accumulated depreciation and impairment losses (cost model) or at their fair value (revaluation 
model). The revaluation model resembles economic depreciation pretty closely. However, when the 
cost model is applied, economic and accounting depreciation may deviate since the cost model is 
based on fixed (e.g. linear) depreciation plans that do not necessarily match economic depreciation. 
As a consequence the size and time-shape of gross income will differ depending on whether 
economic  or   accounting   depreciation   is   used.  These  effects   impact  coefficient-estimates  of 
regressions that rely on gross income as a dependent variable. 
As a consequence, one should test if d is independent of the formation of a cartel. In this 
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case, the lower bound for cartel damages can consistently be estimated following the procedure 
outlined in section A., which relies on the difference between revenues and costs of goods sold 
rather than on gross income. Such a test requires regressing d on possibly explanatory variables and 
a cartel-dummy. d can be omitted in damage calculations if one must accept the hypothesis that the 
coefficient of the cartel-dummy from this regression does statistically not significantly differ from 
zero. If depreciation is found to be affected by the cartel one needs to use gross income as the 
relevant measure of profit. However, in this case one should be extremely cautious in interpreting 
the b-coefficients as a lower bound for cartel damages. This is because of the above problems 
concerning the economic interpretability of d.
D. Cost Efficiencies and Fining of Cartels
In section  A.  the assumption was made, that the cartel affects nothing but prices charged and 
quantity sold, so that a lower bound for cartel damages can be found as the cartel-induced change in 
revenues minus costs of goods sold. In section C. the assumptions on costs was relaxed by allowing 
depreciation to be affected by the cartel. It was found that in this case estimating a lower bound for 
cartel damages requires determining the cartel-induced change in gross income. However, this 
measure must be assumed to be biased since accounting depreciation does not necessarily match 
economic depreciation. In this section D. the assumption on costs is further relaxed by allowing the 
cartel to also affect further cost components such as costs for administration and selling, and capital 
costs. In this situation the cartel may give cartel firms more benefits but overcharging customers. 
This causes a situation where cartel members' additional profits exceed damages awards. Fisher
29 
argues that all such profits should be extracted from a cartel's members in order to guarantee that 
the cartel is rendered unprofitable. This requires calculating additional profits.
First, the cartel may affect depreciation. In this case. the change in total profits equals the 
change in gross income, which can be assessed as described in section C. Second, the cartel may 
also affect expenses for selling and general administration (s; Thomson Reuters Datastream item 
WC01101). Selling, general and administrative expenses contain e.g. marketing and advertising 
expenses, employee costs, directors' remuneration as well as expenses for research and development 
(R&D). As long as prices are above total average costs, these cost components can be considered 
fixed costs whose change does not affect prices. Hence, changes in s affect profits but do not affect 
total damages. Thus, in this case damages must not be inferred from any definition of profits that is 
broader than gross income as defined in equation (16). However, in order to see if all excess profits 
are extracted from cartel firms in form of damages awards one needs to test, if the cartel gives its 
members a cost-advantage in costs for administration and selling. Unfortunately, this measure does 
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not give an exact assessment of excess profits either. One reason for this is that accounting for 
R&D, which is included in s, does not match economic criteria. From an economic viewpoint R&D 
creates an intangible asset such as a patent that creates value over its lifetime and must be 
depreciated accordingly. However, according to German accounting principles R&D is expensed 
immediately. According to IFRS, research is expensed immediately while development expenses 
are recognized as an intangible asset according to IAS 38. As a consequence the accounting stream 
of R&D does not reflect economic profitability well. Hence, estimates of cartel-induced changes in 
e.g. operating income do not necessarily reflect well the economic profitability effects of the cartel. 
One may test the hypothesis of s being independent of collusion by running a regression of s on 
possibly explanatory variables and cartel-dummies, taking value 1 if a cartel is in force and 0 
otherwise. Then one may test whether the coefficients associated with the cartel-dummies differ 
significantly from zero.
Third, the cartel may also affect firms' cost of capital. This may occur via two channels. 
First, the cartel may affect share- and debtholders' interest requirements, causing the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) to change. Second, this change in interest rates may animate cartel-
firms to adapt their capital structure accordingly. These effects affect firms' economic profits and 
can theoretically be inferred from e.g. the cartel-induced change in firms' earnings before taxes 
(EBT). However, even if one suspects these effects, the below analysis suggests that they are hardly 
quantifiable. This is because capital costs can hardly be computed at a high level of accuracy which 
also makes testing for such effects difficult. Therefore, more research is needed in this area.
Much input to this discussion is provided by the literature on the economic value added 
(EVA) as e.g. summarized by Hostettler.
30 In order to compute a firm's true cost of capital one 
would first need to transform its total assets into invested capital. This requires removing assets that 
are related to non-operating activities and add non-capitalized operating assets.
31 An example for the 
latter are assets from research that generate profits but were expensed rather than capitalized in the 
past (e.g. expenses for research) since it was uncertain then whether they would ever generate 
profits. Another example are non-capitalized, leased assets (operating leases). In a second step, one 
needs to estimate the firms' cost of capital rate. Since transforming total assets into invested capital 
is  only  tedious while estimating the cost of capital rate is conceptually more difficult. This is 
because methods such as regressions based on the famous capital asset pricing model or the more 
complex arbitrage pricing theory give plausible estimates that, however, are sensitive to altering 
assumptions e.g. about the time period used for estimations. Bartholdy and Peare
32  find both 
30 Stephan Hostettler,  Economic Valued Added (EVA) Darstellung und Anwendung auf Schweizer Aktiengesellschaften 
(Bern, Verlag Paul Haupt 1997, 5th ed.)
31 Above n 30
32 Jan Bartholdy/Paula Peare, 'Estimation of expected return: CAPM vs. Fama and French', 14  International Review of Page 14 of 27 Using Accounting Data in Cartel Damage Calculations
methods to yield similar estimates. Moreover, Bruner et al.
33 find that differing assumptions can 
well drive a wedge between estimated costs of equity of 4 percentage points. This indicates that 
cartel-induced changes in capital costs can hardly be quantified empirically. This leads to the 
question if one should expect cartels to affect its members' capital costs at all.
Investors require an interest on their investment which at least equals the interest that they 
could earn when investing in a project with a similar risk-structure elsewhere. Hence, the 
assumption of a constant cost-of-capital rate requires that the cartel neither affects cartel-firms' risk-
structure nor the interest paid by other firms. These assumptions are not a priori satisfied. 
Participating in a cartel may lead to a higher volatility of revenue and profits since e.g. cartel-
periods may be interrupted by price wars while the discovery of the cartel is likely to cause fines 
imposed on the firms by competition authorities. This volatility mainly carries over to dividends 
paid to shareholders who might, therefore, adjust their interest requirements upwards. This requires 
shareholders to being able to perceive the volatility in profits that is caused by a secret agreement. 
Such a change in the interest on equity may also alter the relation of interest on equity and interest 
on debt which may cause cartel-firms to adjust their capital structure. This capital-structure effect of 
the cartel should be more likely if also the minimum required interest on debt changes. In this 
context, one might want to consider that non-colluding firms in the cartelized industry may also 
raise prices under the cartel's price umbrella. This makes non-cartel firms more profitable and 
allows for higher interest requirements of debtholders. It is unclear if this effect is strong enough to 
affect interest rates on debt that are also charged from firms in other industries, i.e. the overall 
interest level. These effects deserve further theoretical as well as empirical research. However, as 
they are not crucial for the quantification of damages but only for the question whether all excess 
profits are extracted by damage awards, these effects are not evaluated here any further.
III. USING ACCOUNTING DATA TO ASSESS CARTEL EFFECTS – EMPIRICS
In this section the method for quantifying cartel-induced damages, that is proposed in section II.A., 
is implemented for the famous and well-researched vitamins cartel. Connor
34 considers the vitamins 
cartel to be “the first, the biggest, most elaborate, most complete, longest lasting, and most 
influential of the cartel pandemics of the 1990s.” Section A. briefly describes the vitamins cartel 
and the data used. 
Financial Analysis (2005), at 423
33 Robert Bruner/Kenneth Eades/Robert Harris/Robert Higgins, 'Best Practices in Estimating the Cost of Capital: 
Survey and Synthesis', Financial Practice and Education (Spring/Summer 1998), at 23, 27
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Connor
35  states that the vitamins cartel “extracted historically unprecedented monopoly 
overcharges from customers. These overcharges later appeared on the profit statements of the 
vitamin manufacturers.” Hence, section B. is concerned with identifying a lower bound for damages 
brought about by the vitamins cartel. This is done using the techniques outlined above. In section C. 
the difficulties are presented and evaluated that arise when using these techniques.
A. The Vitamins Cartel
Between 1989 and 1999 several European, Japanese, and North-American producers of vitamins 
colluded in prices.
36 Among these firms were BASF, Roche, Daiichi, and Takeda that agreed to 
jointly raise prices of the vitamins shown in Table 1. Vitamins can be regarded as a relatively 
homogeneous good. This facilitates the detection of deviations from agreed cartel prices and 
contributes to cartels' stability. Moreover, vitamin production requires detailed technical skills 
which prevents quick entry into the industry. Different vitamins cannot be substituted and require 
different production techniques. Therefore, each type of vitamin constitutes its own separate market. 
Table 1 gives basic information on the structure of these cartels. The supposed cartel-leader (i.e. 
Hofmann-La Roche in five cases) is highlighted in bold. One may note that the cartels in vitamins 
B1, B6, and folic acid and the one in vitamins C and B2 faced strong competition from Chinese 
exports and, thus, lasted only for 4 respectively 5 years. In vitamin B4 cartel-firms were put under 
competitive pressure by some small competitors. Market concentration was especially high for 
vitamins A, E, B5, and beta-carotene. Markups on vitamins are quite high for vitamins that are sold 
for human use on retail level. Here, manufacturers' prices of raw vitamins account only for 5-6% of 
the retail price. In comparison “mark-ups for feed- and food-grade vitamins are fairly modest.”
37 
Still, demand for vitamins is found to be fairly inelastic.
38 The cartel-firms were prosecuted and 
fined by the US-American and the European competition authority in 1999 after Rhône-Poulenc 
had sought leniency in 1998.
35 Id at 277
36 More detailed descriptions of the vitamins cartel can be found in John Connor, Global Price Fixing – Our 
Customers are the Enemy (Norwell, Kluver Academic Publishers 2001) and Julian Clarke/Simon Evenett, 'The 
deterrent effects of national anticartel laws: evidence from the international vitamins cartel', The Antitrust Bulletin 
(Fall 2003), 689-726 and Harry First, 'The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International 
Competition Law', 68  Antitrust Law Journal (2001), 711-734
37 Above n 8, at 294
38 Id, at 319Page 16 of 27 Using Accounting Data in Cartel Damage Calculations
Prices for vitamins are found to be raised gradually over time rather than being lifted up in 
one big price-step after the formation of the cartel. Moreover, after the discovery of the cartel prices 
dropped by about 50% within two months leaving prices 30-40% lower than in the pre-cartel 
period. However, these price movements are not uniform across all vitamins affected. E.g. prices for 
liquid vitamin A almost tripled during the collusive phase. Even after the end of the conspiracy this 
price was 62% above its pre-conspiracy level.
39 Moreover, the prices for vitamins B1, B6, folic acid, 
C, and B2 were not raised as strongly as those for vitamins A and E. Because of the strong Chinese 
competition some prices even dropped below the pre-conspiracy level during the cartel-phase. The 
cartel in vitamin B4 also highlights the importance of looking at transaction prices rather than list 
prices. In this case list prices remained fairly constant while the gap between list prices and 
transaction prices was reduced because of the cartel.
Yearly firm-level data of the above firms' revenues and costs of goods sold is collected from 
the ThomsonReuters Datastream database for the period 1985 to 2007.
40  These variables are 
measured in thousands of each national currency, i.e. Euro for BASF, Swiss Franks for Roche, and 
Yen for Daiichi and Takeda. Figure 2 gives an overview on the development of these four firms' 
revenue and costs of goods sold as well as the difference and ratio of these two values. Obviously, 
there is no change in these values that might clearly be attributed to the cartel. Solely for BASF it is 
remarkable that the ratio of revenue and costs jumps on a higher level during the cartel period. 
Moreover, it is much smaller than the other firms' ratios and follows a different time trend. 
Converting revenues and costs to US-$ does not change much for Roche, Daiichi and Takeda but 
strongly impacts the time-series for BASF. Therefore, it appears reasonable to maintain national 
currencies.
39 Id, at 322
40 For Daiichi data is used for the period 1985 to 2005 since in 2006 it merged with Sankyo. Data of the merged firm is 
not easily comparable to data of Daiichi alone.
Table 1: The Vitamins Cartel
A and E C and B2 B5 B4 Fines (in 1999)
(1) duration 1990-1999 1991-1994 1991-1995 1991-1998 1991-1998 1989-1996
(2) no. of participants 4 3 4 3 2 6
(3) strong competition X X X
(4) market share 45-60% 90% 90%
(5) BASF X X X X X 225m USD 296m EUR
(6) Roche X X X X X 500m USD 462m EUR
(7) Takeda X X 72m USD 37m EUR
(8) Daiichi X X 25m USD 23m EUR




70% (in '90) 
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B. Quantifying Cartel Damages in the Vitamins Cartel
As proposed in section II.A. an estimate of the lower bound for cartel-damages Dp/DDKj as defined 
in equation (4) can be found as b from a time-series regression as defined in (9), given that the 
cartel affects nothing but firms' revenues and costs of goods sold. Please note, that only one cartel-
dummy can be used for BASF's and Roche's participation in the cartels of vitamins B5 and beta-
carotene as both cartels occurred at the same time. Since using yearly data keeps time-series short 
(23 respectively 21 observations in case of the present dataset) one must be parsimonious in 
specifying the set of further explanatory variables X.
For BASF an IFRS-dummy  is included covering the effects of BASF switching from 
German-GAAP to IFRS in 2004. A further dummy is included that takes value 1 from 1999 on and 
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0 otherwise which captures the effect of the introduction of the Euro. A further variable is incoming 
orders in the chemical industry.
41 Since the US-market for vitamins is quite important, the US-
$/Euro exchange rate is also included in X. A White-test indicates heteroscedasticity, while a Jarque-
Bera test implies normally distributed error terms. Therefore, estimation is done by standard 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  None of the 
coefficients is significant except for the one associated with incoming orders (p-value 2.2%). 
However, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates positive, first-order autocorrelation in the error term 
which implies misspecification of the model. This autocorrelation can be reduced by including 
dummy variables in 1987, '88, '99, and '00. This also increases coefficients' statistical significance 
but partly reverses the signs of the cartel-coefficients. However, such a procedure would appear 
arbitrary since it is uncertain, what real events these dummies shall represent. An Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test indicates that both, the dependent variable and incoming orders, have a unit root. 
Since the error term of a regression of the difference between revenues and costs of goods sold on 
incoming orders indicates stationarity, the variables must be assumed to be cointegrated. Therefore, 
an error correction model is estimated where the first difference of revenues minus costs of goods 
sold Dpt is regressed on a constant a, the first differences of the cartel-dummies DDKj,t, the exchange 
rate of the Euro relative the US-Dollar eEURUSD, the first difference of incoming orders DIOt and an 
error correction term (pt-1 – qIOt-1). The exchange rate is used in levels since it is found to give a 
higher R² and lower information criteria. The first differences of the IFRS- and the Euro-dummy 
remain unconsidered for reasons of parameter-parsimony. Each would take value zero in all periods 
except for one, so that the informational content of the related estimation-coefficients would be low.
t=⋅DKj ,te EURUSD1⋅IOt2−1⋅t−1−⋅IOt−1t   (18)
This regression gives an adjusted R² of 59% with (d2 – 1) not being significantly different from 
zero. Therefore, a regression in first differences can be performed, thus, omitting the error 
correction term. 
t=⋅DKj ,te EURUSD1⋅IOtt   (19)
The adjusted R² of this regression amounts to 53% with a, g, and d1 being significant at the 1%-level 
and taking the expected signs (g < 0 and d1 > 0). The b-coefficients for the cartels in vitamins B4, C, 
and B2 are insignificant, which is reasonable since these vitamins were subject to competition.  The 
b-coefficients for the cartels in vitamins A, E, betacarotene and B5 are significant at the 1%- 
respectively 10%-level. However, these b's are negative which is counterintuitive since one should 
expect revenues minus costs of goods sold c.p. to rise when a cartel is formed and to fall when a 
41 Due to the German reunification the time series of incoming orders in the chemical industry starts in 1991. In the 
appendix it is described how the missing values for 1985-1990 are constructed from similar data for West Germany.Page 19 of 27 Using Accounting Data in Cartel Damage Calculations
cartel breaks down. Therefore, the above models respectively the quite aggregate data used must be 
considered inappropriate for quantifying a lower bound for cartel damages.
For Roche the regression's explanatory variables include the cartel-dummies, a dummy for 
the application of international generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) from 1990 on, a 
linear trend, and the exchange rate of the Swiss Frank and the US-$. A further explanatory variable 
is sales in the Swiss chemical industry provided by the Swiss statistical office.
42 Since a White test 
does not suggest the error term to be heteroscedastic, the model is estimated by OLS. None of the 
cartel-coefficients is found to be statistically significant. Although the dependent variable and 
industry sales are found by an augmented Dickey-Fuller test to have a unit root, an Engle-Granger 
test does not indicate cointegration. However, estimating the model in first differences does not give 
statistically significant coefficients.
In case of Takeda it is found that p kinks upwards in 1999 such that a simple linear trend 
rises too strongly prior to 1999 and too softly afterwards. As a consequence, a second linear trend is 
included starting in 1999. Since for the Japanese chemical industry no data of orders or sales was 
available the only additional variable is the YEN/USD exchange rate. The estimation is done using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The cartel-coefficients are significant and positive at 
the 5%-level for the conspiracy in vitamins B1, B2, and folic acid, and negative and significant at 
the 1%-level for the conspiracy in vitamins B and C2. An F-test also indicates at the 5%-level that 
both coefficients must jointly be different from zero. This indicates that the cartel in vitamins B1, 
B2, and folic acid (C and B2) increased (decreased) Takeda's p by 2.63% (4.18%). However, one 
should also consider that the larger part of p's variation is explained by the trend terms and the 
constant.
The specification for Daiichi is quite rudimentary since, besides the constant and the cartel-
dummies, it only includes a linear trend. Because a White-test does not indicate heteroscedasticity 
the estimation is done using standard OLS. Neither of the cartel-coefficients is found to be 
statistically significant. Moreover, the Durbin-Watson statistic suggests first-order autocorrelation in 
the error term and, thus, indicates misspecification of the model.
42 Since no sales data is available for 1985-1989 the missing values are backcasted based on a regression of the natural 
logarithm of sales on a constant and a linear trend. This regression explains 99% of the dependent variable's 
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Table 2 reports summary statistics for the above regressions, i.e. the adjusted coefficient of 
determination, the p-values of F-tests examining the hypotheses that (a) all coefficients or (b) all 
cartel-coefficients jointly equal zero, the p-value of the Jarque-Bera test for normally distributed 
error terms, and the Durbin-Watson statistics. The latter's values indicate misspecification for at 
least BASF and Daiichi. However, the effects of autocorrelation must be traded off with parameter-
parsimony that is required by the limited number of observation per series.
C. Difficulties in the Above Analysis
The above regressions may be considered inappropriate to identify the cartels' effects on firms' p. 
This may be attributed to two broad  categories of difficulties. On the one hand, the data used may 
be inappropriate for analyses of the above form. On the other hand, the econometric techniques and 
specifications might be considered sub-optimal. These difficulties will be analyzed in turn to give 
recommendations for improvements and further research.
First, the data used is highly aggregated since all analyzed firms employ several lines of 
business. Therefore, both variables, revenue and costs of goods sold, are affected by the entirety of 
managerial decisions in an enterprise such as investments, divestitures, and mergers, even if those 
decisions do not affect the vitamins segment at all. Given the short time-series (and, thus, the 
required parameter-parsimony) as well as the fact, that not all important managerial decisions are 
made public, the above estimates clearly suffer from an omitted-variable bias. These challenges can 
be adressed by using less aggregated, segment-level data. Then, one  only  needs to control for 
decisions and factors that affect the segment of interest rather than the entire firm, which is a much 
easier task. Unfortunately, segment-level analyses often cannot be performed since firms (such as 
BASF, Roche, Takeda, and Daiichi) use to alter segment classifications every few years. Therefore, 
no segment-level time-series for revenues and costs can be constructed that meets sufficient quality-
standards. In this context, it might be one objective for competition policy makers to cooperate 
more strongly with accounting standard setters in order to provide accounting standards that prevent 
firms from altering segment-delineation too often. Considering divestitures, mergers and other 
factors that alter a firm's structure, steady segment-delineations may not be feasible under all 
circumstances. However, in these cases it would be helpful if firms had to provide a detailed and 
Table 2: Summary Statistics
adj. R² DW
BASF 84.87% 0.00% 90.93% 1.04 7.77%
Roche 98.97% 0.00% 10.75% 2.48 46.97%
Takeda 99.69% 0.00% 94.67% 1.77 0.24%
Daiichi 97.17% 0.00% 12.57% 0.75 21.94%
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long-term reconciliation of figures.
Second and as is standard with regressions, the quality of estimates depends on how well the 
specification captures the underlying dynamics. This concerns changes in demand such as business 
cyclicality as well as supply side factors such as input price shocks or the introduction of a new 
technology. Such information can hardly be obtained from firms' financial statements and requires 
detailed information about the industry. However, with sufficient efforts and good access to industry 
experts and high-quality data this task may well be mastered. A more important aspect is how to 
model unobserved factors such as tacit collusion or competitive conduct in an industry. In this 
context, the period 1985-1989 might e.g. not be a good representation of a competitive period in the 
vitamins industry since Marshall et al.
43 find that most price announcements for vitamin A were 
already joint announcements of the cartel-firms. This is consistent with Connor's
44 observation that 
vitamin-prices after the end of the cartel dropped below pre-conspiracy prices. Moreover, as vitamin 
prices were raised stepwise during the cartel
45 one may not expect damages and cartel-profits to be 
the same in every year. Modeling such effects requires at least two things. On the one hand, one 
must know about these effects. This requirement is unlikely to be satisfied short time after the 
discovery of an collusive agreement. On the other hand, it must be possible to model these effects. 
In this context it is not sufficient to only capture the cartel's effect by a simple dummy-variable.
Instead, one needs to model the strength of the collusive agreement. To put it into terms more 
common in the damages-literature, in order to assess cartel damages (from accounting data) one 
needs to do econometric modeling rather than performing a simple before-and-after regression.
46 In 
this context, more research is  needed adressing the question of how to measure the degree of 
anticompetitiveness of a collusive agreement. This also requires to impose more structure about the 
competitive and collusive conduct on the model in order to keep the model estimable, given the 
length of the time-series used. This, in turn, requires to develop tests for the applicability of the 
structural assumptions made.
Third, estimating the above models by (heteroskedasticity-consistent) OLS is probably 
inappropriate since it is not unreasonable to assume a correlation between the occurrence of a cartel 
(i.e. cartel dummies) and unobserved effects (i.e. the error term). Here, one may e.g. think of the 
state of demand that both affects profits and the probability for forming a cartel respectively the 
stability of a cartel. Moreover, the existence of buyer power does directly influence profits but also 
43 Robert Marshall/Leslie Marx/Matthew Raiff, 'Cartel price announcements: The vitamins industry', 26  International 
Journal of Industrial Organization (2008), at 769
44 Above n 8, at 320
45 Id, at 312
46 See e.g. Emily Clark/Mat Hughes/David Wirth, 'Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of 
infringement of EC competition rules: Analysis of Economic Models for the Calculation of Damages', Ashurst Study 
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may affect the probability of forming a cartel by stimulating firms' desire to create a force in 
opposition to strong buyers. Principally, there are two possibilities for dealing with this endogeneity 
issue. On the one hand, one may attempt to proxy such variables and include them in the above 
model. This means advancing the approach towards econometric modeling. On the other hand, the 
effect of endogeneity may be alleviated or removed by using an instrumental variables estimation. 
In this case, one instruments the model with variables that are highly correlated with the presence of 
a cartel but little correlated with the unobserved effects in the error term. Applying the IV-regression 
in two stages we first regress the cartel dummies on variables q that possibly explain the probability 
of forming a cartel. This regression can be interpreted as a linear probability model. In a second step 
one regresses the profitability measure on the probabilities of forming a cartel, estimated in the first 
stage, given the current values of q.
IV. CONCLUSION
Concluding the above analysis, accounting data may neither be considered a blessing nor a menace 
in calculating cartel damages. It is shown that under some testable assumptions accounting data can 
be used for estimating a lower bound for cartel damages. This lower bound can be obtained from a 
regression of the difference between revenues and costs of goods sold on possibly explanatory 
variables and cartel-dummies. This allows for estimating a lower bound for cartel damages even 
when data of prices and quantity sold is unavailable.
It is shown that one may expect accounting data based estimates of damages and/or cartel 
firms' excess profits to be most exact if the cartel only affects infringers' revenues and costs of 
goods sold. This is because these accounting items are defined rather  consistently with their 
economic counterparts. If the cartel also affects further cost components such as depreciation d and 
expenses for administration and selling s (including R&D-expenses) one needs to account for these 
effects in the calculation of damages and/or cartel firms' excess profits. Since both depreciation and 
expenses for administration and selling are not necessarily defined consistenly with economic 
theory, one is advised to rely on such estimates only with care. In this paper it is proposed how to 
econometrically test whether s and/or d systematically vary with the cartel. Additionally, one must 
be aware that the above variables might be affected by measures of earnings management. This may 
bias damage-estimates in either direction. Interpreting such estimates, thus, requires taking  into 
account different accounting standards' tolerance for earnings measurement.
The proposed estimation procedures are applied to four firms that participated in the 
vitamins cartel. These estimations highlight further challenges when using accounting data. If only 
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parsimonious leaving much variation unexplained. Preferably, quarterly or even monthly data 
should be used. Moreover, for multiproduct firms time series of a sufficient length may only be 
available at an aggregated level. Such firm-level data is exposed to many influences besides the 
cartel-effect. Therefore, cartel-effects are hard to quantify. Preferably, one may want to use 
segment-level data. However, at segment level time series must be expected being too short for a 
meaningful econometric analysis as firms generally alter their segments' delineation every few 
years.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper that explicitly explores the benefits and obstacles of 
using accounting data in econometric analyses of cartel-damage calculations. It is found that 
economists should not discard accounting data for calculating cartel damages per se. Under some 
assumptions a lower bound for cartel damages can consistently be estimated from accounting data. 
Further research might be directed to augmenting the above estimation procedures with prior 
knowledge and structural assumptions that are based on economic theory. In this context, one 
challenge is to correctly model the strength of the collusive agreement. Modeling the cartel by a 
dummy-variable taking value one if the cartel is in force and zero otherwise appears to be over-
simplifying. This is because a dummy-variable of this form neither adequately reflects adaption 
processes in the cartel establishment process nor periods of price wars. Therefore, more research is 
needed addressing the question of how to measure the degree of anticompetitiveness of a collusive 
agreement.Page 24 of 27 Using Accounting Data in Cartel Damage Calculations
APPENDIX
Incoming Orders in the German Chemical Industry
The German Statistical Office (Destatis) provides a monthly value index for incoming orders in the 
chemical industry with base value 100 in year 2000. Since this value index applies to the reunified 
Germany the time series starts in 1991. A similar index is provided for West Germany from 1991 to 
2003. Destatis also provides a value index for incoming orders in the west German chemical 
industry with base year 1985 (IOw85t). In principle, the missing values of IOt can be computed in 
two ways.
First, a two-step procedure may be applied. The index for entire Germany (IOt) can be 
calculated from the values of the index for West Germany (IOwt) based on equation (20). This 
equation results from an OLS-regression of IOt on IOwt, a constant, and a linear monthly trend in 
the overlapping interval 1991 to 2003. Standard errors are given in parentheses and the adjusted R² 







⋅trend   (20)
This value index can be related to IOwt via equation (21). This equation is the outcome of an OLS-
regression of IOwt on IOw85t, a constant, and a linear monthly trend in the overlapping interval 








⋅trend   (21)
The missing values of IOt for the interval 1985 to 1990 can, thus, be constructed from IOw85t using 
equations (20) and (21).
Second, the missing values of IOt can be obtained in one step by directly regressing IOt on 
IOwt, a constant, and a linear monthly trend in the overlapping interval 1991 to 2003. The results 
are shown in equation (22). Standard errors are given in parentheses and the adjusted R² of this 







⋅trend   (22)
This second method is used for supplementing IOt since in the overlapping period 1991 to 1994 the 
forecasted values of  IOt  from (22)  match the true ones slightly better than those generated by 
equations (20) and (21).Page 25 of 27 Using Accounting Data in Cartel Damage Calculations
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